Political Culture And Malaysia

Political Culture And MalaysiaAbstract Pre-1999 studies pictured Malaysia as having a subject g everyplacenmental horticulture. The post-2008 survey data shows Malaysia having a participant political culture and a high level of participation. The 2008 elections which witnessed the emergence of a strong emulation in the fantan reflect the maturity of the Malayan electorate which augurs healthful for democracy in the country.Keywords Malaysian political culture, elections, electoral behaviour, re holdasi, democracyThe results of the 2008 elections in which the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (National Front or BN), befuddled two-thirds majority which it enjoyed, for half a pennyury, to a loosely combined opposition parties, is argued by many to be the extension of the bare-ass idiom of political relation created in 1998. The electoral change in 2008, according to sev eral electoral studies, augurs rise for the democratization of the country.1Projecting democracy for Malaysi a entails an understanding of her political culture. A democratic form of participatory political system requires as hearty a political culture consistent with it.2It is sometimes termed the substructure of the land because its underlying values and beliefs forge the operation of all social and political organizations.3Political culture, derived from a structural-functional model of the political process, is defined as the political attitudes, beliefs, values and skills within an entire population, as well as those within separate parts of that population.4It is the set of values within which a political system operates.5To Almond and Verba, it is the pattern of drutherss to political objects among the members of the nation.6They divided orientations into cognitive, affectional and evaluative dimensions. Cognitive orientation refers to knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs. Affective orienta tion is feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance fleck evaluative orientation is the judgments and opinions about political system and usually involves a combination of value standards and criteria with information and feeling. On this basis, Almond and Verba identified three cultural orientations parochial, subject, and participant.7Parochialism is characterized by worldwide ignorance about political objects. In subject political culture, citizens possess the requisite political knowledge without the sense that they could be effective political actors. Participant political culture combines knowledge about politics with a willingness to participate in the political process. After a period of some disuse, cultural approaches to understanding politics have experienced a revival in re centimeime years.Scholars in the past did explore the political culture of Malaysia but with limited empirical present owing to the paucity of survey research. The c ontemporary political culture can, however, be analysed by using public opinion surveys conducted in Malaysia in recent years. This theater reviews the findings of earlier studies on political culture which were based upon intuitive speculation supported by fragmentary evidence from several highly selective studies.8This is followed by an examination of the existing political culture with the help of data from the survey conducted from 12 to 18 April 2008 in Peninsular Malaysia among 1,027 adult citizens. This random sample was class-conscious according to verbalize, ethnicity, age and gender of the respondents. The distributions over age, ethnic groups and religions correspond to national figures. The interviews were conducted in Bahasa Malaysia, Mandarin, Tamil and English using the Computer Assisted Telephone interview (CATI) facilities of the International Islamic University Malaysia. Each interview lasted for about 25 minutes, on average. At a confidence level of 95 per cen t, the survey results have a statistical precision of 2.8 per cent of what they would be if the interviews were conducted with the entire voting age population residing in peninsular Malaysia. The questionnaire contained 38 items. This paper uses only part of the data (24 items) dealing with cognitive, affective and evaluational orientations and voting in the 2008 elections.The Traditional Political CultureMalaysia, with an ara of 127,320 sq miles (329,758 sq km), is a federation of 13 states and 3 federal territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and the newly created administrative capital for the federal government of Malaysia, Putrajaya. correspond to July 2009 estimate, Malaysia has a population of 28.31 million.9Malaysia is a multicultural society, with Malays (54.2 per cent), Chinese (25.3 per cent), Indians (7.5 per cent) and others (13.0 per cent) living side by side in peace. Malays along with the natives of Sabah and Sarawak (Eastern Malaysia), be officially classified as B umiputra (sons of the soil, or indigenes). The non-bumiputras, consist mainly of the Chinese and the Indians whose large- home immigration took place in the 19th century with settlement and modernization.Malaysias political culture is significantly squeeze by the British colonial administration.10The British looked upon the Malays as intellectually deficient and lazy. They admired the Chinese for their industry, entrepreneurship and greed while the Indians were viewed as cheap and compliant labour. Referring to Chinese and Indians, Lucian Pye characterized Malaysian politics as a confrontation of two incompatible cultures with different systems of values and behavioural norms.11Pye, however, mazed out the Indians, perhaps because they atomic number 18 a minority.The Malays are Muslims they speak Bahasa Malayu and maintain traditional customs and practices. They prevalently live in rural areas and their relations are based on mutual help, self-respect and the concept of brotherh ood in Islam. All these impart a feeling of solidarity among the Malays. Malays refer to Malaysia, peculiarly Western Malaysia, as Tanah Melayu (the Land of the Malays) and they are very proud of it. Chandra Muzaffar argues that Malay political culture is a complex mix of elements inherited from the feudal tradition, Western values, and Islam.12Elections and the culture that accompanies it, the crossway of Western influence, are an integral dimension of Malay and Malaysian political culture. The factors that influence voting patterns are the product, among others, of Malay feudal history characterized by respectfulness to the royalty, uncritical acceptance of state authority and subservience to governmental power. Malaysian political leaders expect and they do receive due respect and stamp down electoral support from the Malay electorate. The Malay government is known as kerajaan that refers to the raja who ruled from the pre-colonial courts. Members of parliament and state Legi slative Assembly men are referred to as yang berhormat (he who is honoured), and sustain remarkable resiliency in office. The Malay political culture is parochial and passive they tend to relieve anxieties created by political contravene by avoidance and silence and by repressing emotions in the hope that the problem will go away if matters are smoothed over.13Islam has also impacted on Malay political attitudes and orientations. Islam brought with it a feudal political culture in the 14th or the beginning of the 15th century and reinforced the feudalism of pre-Islamic Malaysia.14The Chinese derive their values from Confucian patterns and assumptions. According to Pye, the Chinese concept of power is one of an unambiguous leader or father figure to whom the subordinates dutifully obey. Both the omnipotent leader and his dutiful subordinates are assumed to be Chinese. Complaints of all sorts should be aired and redress sought from authority figures. The idea of a Chinese leader bec oming the subordinate of a foreigner is culturally unthinkable. Thus, there is no role for minority leadership in a fraternity dominated by a non-Confucian culture. It effectively means that the Chinese can non be subservient to the Malay majority leadership. As a result, a large total of Chinese in Malaysia feel that a truly national politics is unattainable for them.15This makes the Chinese to opt out of the majority system and focus alternatively on special parochial groupings.16The Chinese political culture is aggressive they tend to release anxieties created by political conflict by voicing solicitude to somebody and seek sympathy change surface from bystanders.17Of the current population, the Chinese are the most heterogeneous. Most of them confess to one or more of the three neat religions of mainland China Buddhism, Taoism or Confucianism, and speak Hokkien, Hakka and/or Cantonese. This heterogeneity is reflected in their politics. Unlike the Malays, the Chinese were an d are divided in their loyalties. Most of the Chinese supported the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the component of the BN but many also identified with opposition leftist and reformist parties. Yet, the Chinese were relatively far more mobilized socially and politically than the Malays. Living in urban centres and economically better off, the Chinese had easy access to higher education which tended to make them politically better informed.Indians, oftentimes regarded as a minority race, have made significant contributions to the socio-political and economic maturement of Malaysia. The Indian community is generally found around the urban areas and suburban rubber estates. It is generally believed that most Indians in Malaysia are politically informed and they operate small businesses. Some Indians work as professionals or labourers. They are mobile and entrepreneurial but cherish their values and traditions. Indians are close-knit community and are deeply religious. Many In dians adhere to Hinduism, some of them profess Christianity and Islam. The earlier immigrants had speculative strong ties with their homeland without forming a strong bonding with their adopted country. The 1970s and 1980s generation regard Malaysia as their homeland.The Indian community has been perceived as passive and parochial. They did not cause much anxiety to the imperial rulers. They are culturally divided and their cultural diversity may be identified with their ancestors places of origin. They are mainly Hindu Tamils from southern India, speaking Tamil, Telegu, Malayalam, and some Hindi. In the post-independent Malaysia, the Indians do not form majority of their own in any Malaysian constituency. thereof most of them opted to support the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) which is a component of the ruling Barisan Nasional, in order to light upon access to the Barisan system of the ethnic parceling of political power and material resources. However, a small segment of the Indian community supported opposition.Malaysias multi-ethnicity made it imperative for the elites of each ethnic group to meld in a mutually beneficial fashion. The resultant system is a variant of conosciational democracy in which elections play an important role to fill in the public positions.18In procedural terms, however, Malaysian political system is considered narrow because it constrains the practice of civil and political rights through restrictions on company, the strategic use of grasp orders and other legal and emergency powers. Yet, the pioneering survey of political attitudes in Malaysia conducted in November 1994 found majority of 395 respondents, selected randomly, supported limited practice of democracy.19According to Welsh, Malay respondents boilers suit opposed the expansion of democracy the minorities, especially the Indian respondents, favoured democracy, while the Chinese respondents were more ambivalent.20 there was some sort of congruence between polit ical culture and regime type. In the elections held between 1959 and 1995, the ruling coalition, the BN, constantly maintained two-thirds majority of seats in the parliament as shown in Table 1.Table1 Results of Parliamentary Elections, 1959 to 1995 socio-economic classAlliance/BNOpposition PartiesTotal SeatsSeatsPer centSeatPer cent19597451.83048.210419648958.51541.510419696648.43751.61031974cxxxv60.71939.3154197813157.22442.8154198213260.52239.5154189614857.32941.5177199012754.45346.6180199516265.13034.8192Source Abdul Rashid Moten and Tunku Mohar Mokhtar, Elections and the Electoral System in Malaysia at 50 Achievements and Aspirations, edited by Syed Arabi Idid (Sin cattle ranchore Thomson Learning, 2008), 199.State and Society in TransitionPolitical cultures, though often highly stable, are not immutable. They may evolve over time, and may even be profoundly altered in a short span of time. This change may result from the spread of mass education, technological development, glo balised discourses of human rights and the like. free associations and popular movements may help with the formation of new identities.21In the Malaysian context, the intense economic development programme pursued by the government over the years has led to the transformation of the state, Islamic organizations and civil societies. The political identities of the Malay, Chinese, Indian and other communities have likewise undergone changes.22The British, during the colonial period, pursued policies that created an imbalance in development between the urban sector involved in tin mining and rubber plantation and the rural sector enmeshd in small scale agriculture. Post-independent leaders pursued policies that aimed not merely at developing the economy and alleviating poverty but also at narrowing the differential development gap among diverse groups. The national development policies outlined in the Five Year National Development Plans (NDPs) in the earlier phase concentrated on better the living standards of the rural society by providing facilities for infrastructure, social services and agricultural development. Since 1971, the government, under what was called the New Economic Policy (NEP), embarked upon a socio-economic restructuring affirmative action programme. The NEP aimed at promoting national unity and a just society by attacking poverty and reducing and eventually eliminating the identity of race with economic function.23In 1990, the post-NEP era began with Vision 2020 which espoused a commitment to forging a Bangsa Malaysia, a united Malaysian nation with a sense of a common and shared hazard under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad, who served as Prime Minister from 1982 to 2003. That became the basis of the National Development Policy that aimed, among others, to strike an optimum balance between the goals of economic growing and equity.24Malaysia, under a soft authoritarian regime led by Mahathir Mohamad, made good economic progress, techn ological development and considerable rural-urban migration.25However, the growth was accompanied by an element of patronage leading to significant leakages and disproportionate gains to individuals and companies, such as the Renong, Technology Resources, Berjaya and Tanjong groups, associated with UMNO, the dominant party in the BN, the ruling coalition.26This state-capital nexus in Malaysia is termed party capitalism or money politics. Nevertheless, the economy grew at an average annual rate of 7 per cent during the 1990s. GDP per capita rose from RM 1,090 in 1970 to RM 14,924.3 in 2000. During 1970 to 2000, employment in agriculture shrank from 53.2 per cent to 15.2 per cent while employment in manufacturing increased from 9.0 per cent to 27.6 per cent. Literacy rate for the corresponding period rose from 58.1 per cent to 87.4 per cent. There was also a marked reduction in both rural and urban poverty.27Between 1981 and 1989, economic growth averaged 5.4 per cent which rose to 8 .8 per cent between 1990 and 1996. The middle class expanded from 20 per cent of the working population in 1970 to approximately 45 per cent by 1993.28The rapid expansion of the middle class is considered as an impetus to liberalization and democratization in Malaysia. It has given rise to a consumer culture and a lifestyle dominated by shopping malls, restaurants, and Western-owned fast-food outlets.29Interestingly, this new Malay middle class was suffering from alienation presumably because they did not benefit from party capitalism by joining the elite group who enjoyed the state patronage.The growth of the middle class led to the emergence of civil societies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Aliran was established in August 1977 for the reform of Malaysian society manoeuver by universal spiritual and moral values. It launched its publication Aliran Monthly in 1980. SUARAM (Suara Rakyat Malaysia, or Voice of the Malaysian People) was established in 1987 to promote freed om of expression, assembly and association. HAKAM (Persatuan Kebangsaan Hak Asasi Manusia or The National Human Rights Soceity) was formed in 1990 to work on human rights issues. Tenaganita (Womens Force) was established in 1991 to promote the rights of women workers and migrant workers. In 1993, some 50 NGOs adopted The Malaysian Human Rights Charter. Evidently, these organizations advocate various social, economic, cultural and political causes, interests, and agendas.30They have been instrumental in initiating positive changes in various spheres of life. They have helped Malaysians engage in networking and increase their strength and confidence to solve problems with or without government assistance. Malaysians have learned to form groups, organise meetings and rallies, improve means of communication and gain new knowledge. These associations have been critical of various government policies and voiced their concern in public. Indeed, civil societies became more vocal during the reformasi period.31Reformasi and the Changes in the Electoral BehaviourIn July 1997 money speculators attacked the Malaysian currency which eventually plunged the country into first recession for many years. The financial crisis widened the differences between Prime Minister Mahathir and his ambitious deputy Anwar Ibrahim who was seen as conspiring to overthrow the Prime Minister which became overt in June 1998 at the UMNO party elections in which one of Anwars supporters openly criticised Mahathir for economic mismanagement. The speech came too close on the heels of the Indonesian anti-KKN (kolusi, korupsi dan nepotisme, or collusion, corruption and nepotism) reformasi movement that toppled Suharto in May, a month earlier.32Mahathir blamed currency speculators especially George Soros for the financial crisis whereas Anwar Ibrahim blamed it upon Mahathirs obsession with unproductive mega projects and nepotism. Mahathir would not seek assistance from the International bodies to overc ome the crisis while Anwar was fully committed to adopting rescue package from International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Subsequent swelling from the party, arrest and imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim, on charges of misuse of power and immoral conduct, triggered the movement for reform, reformasi, demanding participatory democracy and justice for all.33The movement drew new actors, namely Malay women, youth and sections of the Malay middle class.34NGOs and civil societies cooperated and coordinated their anti-government actions. Numerous street demonstrations that followed led to the formation of Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat (Coalition for Peoples Democracy or Gagasan), on 27 September 1998, composed of 18 political parties and organizations. Gagasans 10-point joint declaration demanded freedom of speech and assembly, impartial judiciary and the abolition of detention without trial and the draconian Internal Security Act. There also emerged Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysi an Peoples Movement for Justice or Gerak) composed of various Muslim non-governmental organizations but included the opposition political parties like Democratic Action troupe (DAP) and Partai Se-Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS). December 1998 saw the emergence of the Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial (Movement for Social Justice or Adil) under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahims wife, Wan Azizah Ismail, which pressed for political, economic and social reform. Adil, in 1999, metamorphosed into the multi-ethnic Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party or keADILan). Subsequently, KeADILan, DAP, PAS and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian Peoples Party, PRM) formed an opposition alliance known as the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Coalition, BA).Simultaneously, several reformasi-related websites emerged demanding more democratic space, accountability of the rulers and a participatory political system. The first reformasi website, Anwar On-line, was launched on September 1, 1998 and was followed within a few months by over fifty pro-Anwar and pro-reform websites. Well developed professional sites include AIM (Abolish the ISA Movement), Aliran Online, HarakahDaily, Bereita Keadilan, the uninvolved Anwar Campaign, etc. The countrys first commercial on-line newspaper, Malaysiakini, was launched just nine days prior to the general election of 1999. The number of internet users rose from about 500,000 in 1999 to an estimated two million in 2002. The Internet was relatively free from government control and was an important venue for political discourse. The internet has created dense networks linking geographically outspread activists that constitute themselves into the building blocs for bottom-up democratisation process.35As society has changed, with demographic shifts reinforced by new information technologies and globalization process, political culture has changed, too, particularly among the younger generation.36Malaysians became active citizens and took it upon themselves to know, to feel and to evaluate the policies emanating from the political system and to vote accordingly. This is clear from the voting behaviour of the Malaysian electorate in the 10th, 11th and 12th general elections.The tenth elections for parliamentary and state assemblies were held on November 29, 1999 preceded by a nine-day campaign period. The elections saw many non-governmental organizations in the forefront making their voices heard through various mechanisms including the use of internet. The BA contested the November 1999 elections with a joint manifesto Towards a Just Malaysia free from widespread corruption, abuse of power and crippling poverty. The manifesto promised a strong national economy, enhanced government transparency and accountability, national unity and a genuinely democratic society. They took full advantage of the Internet to disseminate information. The opposition front made startling gains winning 45 out of 193 seats in the national parliament. PAS, the major component of the BA, not only retained the state of Kelantan but it also captured the neighbouring, oil-rich Terengganu. Four Malay cabinet ministers and the chief minister of Terengganu lost in the election. Prime Minister Mahathirs winning margin in Kubang Pasu constituency in Kedah had shrunk by about 40 per cent from 1995. Most of BN candidates won with slim margins.The eleventh general elections were held on March 21, 2004 in which the BN won unprecedented 62.37 per cent of the votes and 90.4 per cent of seats in Parliament and recaptured Terengganu lost in 1999. This result shows maturity on the part of the Malaysian electorate for three reasons. One, the leadership of BN has changed. Abdullah Badawi who took office on October 31, 2003 was perceived as friendly and a man of the people. His fight against corruption insistence on public accountability and shift from corporate mega-projects to agro-based, rural projects were well received by th e electorate tired of corruption and confrontational politics.Two, the BN adopted the core reformasi demands of accountability, transparency and good governance. Its manifesto described BN as moving Toward Excellence, Glory, and Distinction. Three, the opposition front, BA, that performed well during the 1999 elections could not continue to work as a team. The cordiality between the parties waned and some of them suffered from financial difficulties and mass defections. The opposition parties contested against each other in many constituencies. Under the circumstances, the best bet for the Malaysian electorate was to vote BN.The reforms Abdullah instituted during the following four years did not meet the public expectation. A number of factors contributed to a rising discontent among Malaysians including rising crime, a number of corruption scandals, the weaknesses of the judicial system, and interferences with the appointment of senior judges and increased food and fuel prices. The opposition parties linked hands under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim and capitalized on the public anger over transparency and accountability. Using alternative media, they highlighted the weaknesses of the government and campaigned effectively in the twelfth elections held on March 8, 2008. The electorate reversed their earlier decision in the 2008 elections denying the ruling coalition its two-thirds majority in parliament and giving the opposition parties control of 5 state assemblies.The reformasi movement is considered by many to be a clear manifestation of a change in Malaysias political culture. They reshaped the configuration of forces and, since then, Malaysian politics has changed. According to Jomo, the reformasi liberated the Malaysian and, in particular, the Malay political discourse.37Since 1998, writes Francis, a new discourse and practice of participatory democracy has gained ground among Malaysians.38Meredith Weiss is emphaticReformasi marked a shift in Malaysian politics. Whatever degree of institutional change has so far occurred, Malaysian political culture now leans more toward new politics-characterized by fragmentation of ethnic communities and contesting discourses of ethnicism, participatory democracy, and developmentalism.39Andres Ufen argues that the Malaysian opposition has succeeded in establishing a viable pro-democratic political culture that is hardly destructible through cut back repression.40The landslide victory achieved by the BN under Abdullah Badawi in 2004 is also a reflection of the maturity of the Malaysian electorate. Citizens voted with the belief that the new government would be reactive to their needs, wants, and purposes which is an ess